In which we discuss the role of non-state-actors and the death of sovereignty.

Much lip service has been recently paid to roles of ‘non-state actors’ in Middle Eastern politics. From Hezbollah, to the assorted violent ethnic minority factions which breach the fragile peace with an explosion, then sink back into the general populace before most Westerners can even learn their names, it seems clear to most who are paying attention that the role of the Iraqi government is marginalized before the power of terrorist organizations and other ‘non-state-actors’. But little of the analysis goes far enough. The levers of power being moved by groups of non-state or sub-state elites extends well beyond the borders of Iraq, and could be considered a defining characteristic of the age in which we live. State sovereignty as a concept seems to now exist only as a UN talking point. We have moved into an era in which sovereign rule of law is no longer a viable mechanic either in the Middle East, or anywhere else.

Sovereignty died in Iraq in 2003 when Saddam Hussein was ousted from power by US led coalition forces. While he was a despot and a fascist in the vein of Mussolini, Hussein was the sovereign leader of the country and was unseated not by rebellion or a coup from within, but through the agency of external force, in clear violation of international law. Since then, a bewildering parade of power parties has operated in the population centers of Iraq, mostly organized around ethnic or religious heritage. After a failed attempt at establishing a legitimate government through elections in late 2005, these factions have continued to further splinter, until what remains can only be described as a civil war. The rest of the Middle East is little better. Firebrand clerics run Tehran, fueled by a massive stream of petro-income. Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine are each only nominally controlled by legitimate national agencies. Their inability to stem the tide of terrorist insurgents flowing from their borders suggests that their control, and the degree to which they are serving the interests of their populations could be questioned.

But the traditional institution of the state fares little better elsewhere. In Russia, Vladimir Putin may act as a sovereign modern czar, but it seems clear that the cabal of former KGB hardliners and Gazprom execs who are currently running the show in Moscow are acting more as an international energy syndicate than out of any desire to steer the ship of state. Gazprom is the world’s third largest corporation, with a $270 billion market capitalization. Behind Saudi Arabia and Iran, they are the world’s third largest energy supplier. And like Enron or Bechtel, Gazprom, and Putin as its hired gun in the Kremlin, can only be considered non-state actors. Now Putin is ostensibly the sovereign leader of Russia, but as can be seen from his recent withdrawal of Dutch-Shell’s permit to extract liquefied natural gas at Sakhalin, it is Gazprom’s interests in which he is operating. Sending a message to international corporations that Russia is an unsafe place to make massive investments is not a wise long term plan for the state, it is strategically foolish, unless Gazprom’s interests, not Russia’s are his true concern.

As we can see from this example, it is not just Hezbollah or other Islamic radical groups which comprise the non-state actors which are subverting the notion of sovereignty internationally. The global mega-corporations whom the anti-globalization so rails against are quite often the real power behind the hollow throne. This is not a particularly new phenomenon. The East India Trading Company, generally regarded as the first global corporation, wielded enormous power in British Parliament as much as a century ago. But there are some not-so-subtle differences. For while the EITC was a mighty economic force for England, and used their considerable influence to help shape colonial conquest, much as Enron used it’s influence to encourage the invasion of Iraq, there has been a more stark dividing line between corporations and sovereign governments in the past. Now, Putin is in the pocket of Gazprom, and Dick Cheney and the Halliburton team enjoy an unprecedented degree of power in the United States. The line between corporations and state leaders has dissolved.

Now add to this climate the death of two other hallmarks of traditional operations of sovereign states:

Consider first the presence in the supposedly democratic United States of a leader who clearly lost the popular election, and who even more clearly does not have any mandate to rule based on the will of the people of his country. This lack of a legitimate US leader, in a country which is supposed to be the world’s best at democracy, suggests that even the pretence of rule “by the people” has been retired.

Second, the failure of the US to abide by international treaties (like the Geneva Conventions), signifies a quiet sea change in our definition of self. We are no longer acting like a country which is a part of the international community. The leaders of countries which have a functional, sovereign government respect the international agreements signed by their predecessors, or negotiate new treaties. This mutual agreement is what forms the basis which allows countries to deal with one another as discreet entities, not simply as ever shifting collections of individuals.

The internal consistency by which rule of law is maintained and the parliamentary procedures by which the mechanics of government are held in accordance with their charters are the inner hallmarks of a sovereign country. The adherence to international treaties, and the willingness to respect the sovereignty of other countries is the outer hallmarks of a sovereign country. It seems clear that the United States is now failing to maintain both inwardly and outwardly.

Ruling cabals of the elite are not new. C. Wright Mills warns of them in the United States in the late nineteen fifties, and the concept is central to Mosca’s understanding of state dynamics. (“The few will always rule the many. Democracy and popular sovereignty are unmasked as mere myths. Contests for control are not between the many and the few but between one elite group and another. At best, the advances of freedom will be a mere byproduct of the recurring quarrels between dominant minorities.”) Written in the nineteen twenties, Mosca’s dire phrasing seems to near perfectly describe the situation in Iraq today. If we agree with Mosca and Mills, the elite non-state actors have been in control for more than a century; all that has changed is that the pretense of state sovereignty and legitimacy has been dropped.

But there is a glimmer of hope here, and it is fairly new. There is a much reviled type of non-state-actor which also wields enormous power, which it has only recently learned how to flex. This upstart player is the fifth estate: the popular press and the blogsphere. Consider the influence wielded by Al Jazeera, the Arabic television station, whose popularity quite dwarfs any power which can be wielded by, say, anyone in the Iraqi government. Beginning with President Nixon’s Watergate scandal in the United States, the press has developed as powerful, non-state actor. While the egalitarian nature of this many faceted beast is frequently deplorable (consider lurid attention focused on the Monica Lewenski affair), this is also its power. The internet, blogging, and self-publishing have significantly magnified this leverage, as has the adoption of slicker, mainstream expressions of influence, like the popular Jon Stewart show in North America. This explosion of expressed perspectives, though frequently sounding like a bewildering multitude of voices in the wilderness, can help overcome what has traditionally been one of the great tools of those elites in power: control of information. The era of dominance by the likes of Pravda and Rupert Murdoch, which have traditionally served only as tools of the ruling cabals, is nearing an end.

The problem of how to control and understand non-state actors in the Middle East is not new, as the New York Times has suggested, and it is not just in the Middle East.

From Baghdad to Moscow to Washington, elite ruling syndicates have ceased to recognize the rules which have served to guide the positions of sovereign states for centuries. Soverignty as a concept is nearing it’s functional end.

But for all the talk in the mainstream press about the power of non-state actors, few have recognized that for the first time, this power is now beginning to trickle into the hands of the many, if only they could shake off the shroud of apathy and ignorance and make use of it.